CVE Explorer

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: actions: Move setting of netops to fix crash owl_emac_probe() calls owl_emac_phy_init(), which connects the PHY, before netdev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mv643xx: move setting of netops to fix crash mv643xx_eth_probe() connects the PHY before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: au1000: move setting of netops to fix crash au1000_probe() calls au1000_mii_probe(), which connects the PHY, before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethoc: move setting of netops to fix crash ethoc_probe() calls ethoc_mdio_probe(), which connects the PHY, before netdev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: aeroflex: move setting of netops to fix crash greth_of_probe() calls greth_mdio_init(), which connects the PHY, before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ti: icssm-prueth: Move setting of netops to fix crash icssm_prueth_netdev_init() calls of_phy_get_and_connect() before ndev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL. ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it. Unshare the skb before writing the control block. Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same skb while earlier copies are still in the ring: modprobe pktgen pg=/proc/net/pktgen echo "add_device eth0" > $pg/kpktgend_0 echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0 echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0 echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0 echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0 echo start > $pg/pgctrl & sleep 5 echo stop > $pg/pgctrl wait cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at zero.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr() calipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the option it inserts or resizes: payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len); ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta); GRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores payload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to skb->len. For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to CALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when shrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls back to skb->len. nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it. The same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN, and a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its real length back. Set payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which stores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as ipv6_gro_complete() does. The network header was just reset to skb->data, so skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length. Tested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal mdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), "netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:16" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO DOI 16. calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through netlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of this patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call: case before fix after fix real length 1000, unlabeled 1016 1016 1016 70000 GSO, payload_len 0 16 0 70016 65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN 10 0 65546 65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop header, shrinks below MAXPLEN 65528 65532 65532 1000 with a 24 byte hop header 992 992 992 (0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.) On the forward path, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a server, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all datagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpiolib: fix memory leak in gpiod_set_array_value_complex() on error paths A drive-by review by Sashiko reports that, after a failed call to gpiochip_set_multiple(), gpiod_set_array_value() returns abruptly, bypassing the freeing of possibly alloced bitmaps, potentially leaking memory. It is an unlikely error path, but is possible. Defer the return code check until after the bitmap_free() block.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: mxc: fix race between chained IRQ handler install and probe completion mxc_update_irq_chained_handler() is called before the IRQ domain, the generic IRQ chip, and the port list entry are set up. If an interrupt arrives in that window: - mx3_gpio_irq_handler() calls generic_handle_domain_irq() with port->domain still NULL. - mx2_gpio_irq_handler() walks mxc_gpio_ports, but the port has not been added to the list yet. Additionally, if any of the subsequent probe steps (gpio_generic_chip_init(), devm_gpiochip_add_data(), irq_domain_create_legacy(), or mxc_gpio_init_gc()) fail, the error paths never unregister the chained handler, leaving a dangling handler that points at freed memory. Move the handler installation after all its dependencies are ready and after list_add_tail(), so the handler is never live while the data structures it touches are incomplete, and is never installed if probe fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: dwmac1000: clear the RGMII status interrupt Since commit 2e2c878a3141 ("net: stmmac: remove SGMII/RGMII/SMII interrupt handling") nothing on the RGMII path reads GMAC_RGSMIIIS, so RGSMIIIS stays pending behind GMAC_INT_MASK from the first link change on. stmmac_resume() resets the MAC in stmmac_hw_setup(); the reset sets GMAC_INT_MASK to 0 until dwmac1000_core_init() writes the mask again, and the pending status storms the line: dwmac_dma_interrupt: unexpected status 04000000 A register dump at the first message on ODROID-HC4 showed it: core int_status 00000001 int_mask 00000000 pmt 00000000 rgsmiiis 0000000d When the resume thread runs on the CPU that takes the MAC interrupt, the storm starves it: a soft lockup, then a watchdog reset or a hang. Read GMAC_RGSMIIIS in dwmac1000_irq_status() when the status is not masked, as the driver did before 2e2c878a3141; the read clears it. Wake-on-LAN resume from s2idle with the resume thread and the MAC interrupt on one CPU: Helios64 (dwmac-rk), 7.3-rc6, soft-locked in 3 of 3 resumes without a fix and in 0 of 10 with this patch; it ran with an out-of-tree dwmac-rk change that keeps the GMAC powered across suspend. ODROID-HC4 (dwmac-meson8b): 0 of 10 with this patch, 2 of 2 without a fix on a 7.3-rc5 build. irq_rgmii_n went up by one per resume.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix perf_pmu_migrate_context() leaving events behind __perf_pmu_remove() walks the group leaders of a CPU and PMU with perf_event_groups_for_cpu_pmu(), removing each one as it goes. perf_remove_from_context() takes the leader out of the groups rbtree, after which rb_next() on that node returns NULL, prematurely ending the walk. Other groups stay behind in the source context. On CPU hotplug, they are then torn down with the dying CPU. They keep running until teardown, while the PMU's interrupt and migrated events are on a new CPU, which drivers rely on never happening. Walk ctx->event_list instead and pick out the PMU's events by their pmu_ctx.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/insn-eval: Fix shadowed segment index in get_seg_reg_override_idx() Commit 45e1dccc0653 ("x86/insn: Simplify for_each_insn_prefix()") made for_each_insn_prefix() declare its own loop counter named idx. get_seg_reg_override_idx() keeps its result in a local of the same name, so the assignments in the loop body now write the loop counter: - the function always returns INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT, so FS and GS overrides are ignored; - a CS override sets the counter to INAT_SEG_REG_CS (2), the increment makes it 3, and prefixes.bytes[3] holds the last prefix, 0x2e again, so the loop never terminates. The UMIP emulation reaches this from the #GP handler for user space: an SGDT, SIDT or SMSW with a memory operand and a CS prefix leaves the task spinning in the kernel, never returning to user space, with a SIGKILL that is never delivered. Any user can thus tie up CPUs until reboot. With an FS or GS prefix, the emulated result is written to the wrong address. Rename the internal macro iterator variable. [ Lukas' original patch renamed the use site, I changed it to rename the iterator in the macro instead, but left Lukas' commit message and authorship - Linus ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling For a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or split_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction entry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete() is used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction is a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout callback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must leave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove. A previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race condition in which both functions could process the same transaction. This could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side. Fix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process the transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is responsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when a core is removed rocket_remove() decrements rdev->num_cores for each core it removes, while find_core_for_dev() searches slots 0 to num_cores - 1. Unbinding the cores in the order they were bound therefore loses the last one: by the time it is removed the search range has already shrunk past its slot, so find_core_for_dev() returns -1 and rocket_remove() gives up without doing anything. num_cores never reaches zero, rocket_device_fini() never runs, and the file-scoped rdev keeps pointing at a device that is going away. Binding the cores again starts from that stale count, because rocket_probe() takes rdev->num_cores as the slot to fill. On an RK3588, which describes three cores, the second round lands on slots 1, 2 and 3 while rdev->cores was allocated with room for three: rocket fdab0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 1 version: 1179210309 rocket fdac0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 2 version: 1179210309 rocket fdad0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 3 version: 1179210309 The write to rdev->cores[3] is past the end of the array. Nothing in tree reads the core array often enough to notice, so the overrun is silent today. It turned up while testing a devfreq series on top of this, where a worker walks every core a few times a second, and UBSAN caught the first bool it read out of the overrun entry: UBSAN: invalid-load in drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_devfreq.c:47:10 load of value 5 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' Workqueue: devfreq_wq devfreq_monitor Record how many slots were allocated and search all of them. Every core is then found on removal, num_cores reaches zero, the device is torn down and a later bind starts from a clean rdev. This does not make unbinding a single core out of several work. probe still takes num_cores as the slot to fill, so rebinding one core while its siblings stay bound would write over a slot that is already in use, and rocket_open() still reaches for cores[0] whether or not anything is there. Both of those want more thought than a fix should carry. Found by unbinding and rebinding all three cores on an Orange Pi 5 Plus. With this applied, 25 unbind/rebind rounds and 5 module unload/reload rounds run clean there: the cores land in slots 0, 1 and 2 every time, whichever order they are bound in, and the shared supply goes back to a single user after each round.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when looking up a scheduler sched_to_core() walks rdev->cores[] up to rdev->num_cores, and rocket_remove() decrements num_cores for every core it removes. Unbind a core that is not the last one and the cores behind it fall outside the search, so sched_to_core() returns NULL for a core that is still bound and still running jobs. Neither caller checks the result: rocket_job_run(): rocket_fence_create(core), core->dev rocket_job_timedout(): dev_err(core->dev, "NPU job timed out") Unbinding the middle core of the three on an RK3588 while three clients are submitting to all of them faults twice, once from the surviving core's job queue and once from its reset work: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000220-0x0000000000000227] Workqueue: fdad0000.npu drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x2cc/0xad8 [gpu_sched] process_one_work+0x640/0x14f0 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: rocket-reset-2 drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] drm_sched_job_timedout+0x188/0x6a0 [gpu_sched] Both are the third core: the workqueue names are its device and its core->index, and it was left at slot 2 while num_cores had dropped to 2. Search all the slots that were allocated, the way find_core_for_dev() now does. A core that is still bound is then found, and the two callers get the pointer they already assume they have. This does not make unbinding one core out of several safe. An open client keeps an entity pointing at the scheduler of the core that went away: drm_sched reports it as not ready for every job that lands on it, and the client waits in dma_fence_default_wait for a fence that will never signal. Stopping the NULL dereference is what belongs in a fix; the rest wants more thought.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix shift-out-of-bounds for aggregated ALH capture When ch_count is smaller than blob->alh_cfg.device_count (e.g. a mono capture stream, such as a SmartMic, aggregated across multiple SDW links), step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count truncates to 0. The subsequent GENMASK(step - 1, 0) then underflows step - 1 (u32) to UINT_MAX, causing GENMASK()'s internal shift to use an out-of-bounds exponent: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c:2363:13 shift exponent 18446744069414584384 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' Treat ch_count < device_count the same way as the existing "channels equal to output reference channels" case: apply the same ch_mask to every aggregated device instead of trying to split channels that can't be evenly divided.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: autofs: ignore notification errors from a replaced pipe autofs_notify_daemon() takes a reference to the current notification pipe under wq_mutex, then drops the mutex before writing the request. The write can block while the daemon enters catatonic mode and installs a replacement pipe. If the old pipe's reader is then closed, the delayed write returns -EPIPE and the generic error path enters catatonic mode again. That transition acts on the current superblock state, closes the replacement pipe, and releases the new daemon generation's wait queues. Only enter catatonic mode when the pipe which failed is still the current pipe. Factor the already-locked transition so the identity check and state change are atomic with respect to another replacement. This was reproduced on v7.3-rc5-337-gff47652a4b66c in a local QEMU guest. An unprivileged UID 65534 lookup filled the old packet pipe before a normal CATATONIC/SETPIPEFD restart. On the unmodified kernel, the new pipe received HUP and both a pending victim lookup and a later lookup failed with ENOENT in two out of two fresh-mount runs. With this change, the new pipe remained active, received an intact 304-byte request, and both victim lookups completed in two out of two runs. Normal lookup and restart-without-a-blocked-writer controls passed. No KASAN, oops, refcount, or lock diagnostic was observed. A source reproducer and complete local logs are available privately on request. The demonstrated impact is limited to denial of a shared autofs service during a legitimate daemon restart. No memory corruption, information leak, privilege escalation, or code execution primitive was observed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unicode: free the map after a grace period generic_ci_d_hash() and generic_ci_d_compare() read sb->s_encoding and dereference the unicode map while a pathwalk in rcu mode holds nothing but rcu_read_lock(). The filesystems that use them, ext4, f2fs and tmpfs, drop the map with utf8_unload() from ->put_super(), which runs when the last reference to the mount goes away. A lookup that is still inside such a filesystem at that point reads a freed map. With a pathwalk held up in utf8_casefold_hash() while the last reference to a casefolded tmpfs goes away: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950 Read of size 8 at addr ff110001030fe658 by task walker/98 Call Trace: <TASK> utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950 utf8byte+0x160/0x1560 utf8_casefold_hash+0x167/0x230 generic_ci_d_hash+0xdd/0x1c0 link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30 path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00 filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0 vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0 [...] Allocated by task 94: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560 utf8_load+0x4e/0x570 shmem_parse_opt_casefold.isra.0+0x92/0x270 [...] Freed by task 97: kfree+0x1db/0x5b0 shmem_put_super+0x72/0x170 generic_shutdown_super+0x14c/0x530 kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0 cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130 So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period in namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose last reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir out of a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker. So it is reachable. Delay the free until a grace period has passed. The map and the data table it holds a reference to then outlive any pathwalk that found the superblock before the mount went away. The reference on the data table module is dropped from the rcu callback as well. utf8-core is built in whenever CONFIG_UNICODE is set, so there is no module exit that would have to wait for the callbacks. Overlayfs points the s_encoding of an overlay at the map of its first layer without taking a reference of its own. That stays correct. The layer is held by the overlay, so its map is dropped only after the overlay is gone.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size() There is a race between watch_queue_set_size() and post_one_notification(). watch_queue_set_size() publishes wqueue->notes, notes_bitmap, nr_pages and nr_notes with plain stores, and post_one_notification() reads them with plain loads under a different lock, so nothing orders the four stores against the poster's loads: depending on the build, notes can be stored last (gcc 14 on x86-64 does this). Since keyctl_watch_key() lets a watch attach to a queue before it is sized, post_one_notification() can already be running on another CPU at that moment: it reads nr_notes > 0, passes its bounds check, and then reads notes while it is still NULL, dereferencing notes[0]. An unprivileged user triggers this reliably by watching one of its own keys through a notification pipe and racing ioctl(IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE) on that pipe against keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM) on the key from another CPU, triggering: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:post_one_notification.isra.0+0xa2/0x1e0 Call Trace: __post_watch_notification+0x148/0x180 keyctl_setperm_key+0x119/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x108/0x4c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Fix this by publishing nr_notes last with smp_store_release(), and by reading it once with smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification() before the bitmap and the page array are touched. A poster that observes a non-zero nr_notes then also observes the pool behind it; one that observes zero drops the notification as before.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kvm: Don't consume async #PF flags on a kernel #PF in NMI context An async #PF "page not present" event arrives through the #PF vector, and its reason sits in the per-CPU apf_reason.flags until __kvm_handle_async_pf() reads and clears it. If an NMI arrives after the event is injected and before the #PF handler reads the flags, and the NMI handler itself takes a #PF, that fault reads and clears the flags belonging to the #PF it interrupted. It then finds interrupts disabled in the NMI context it interrupted, and panics: Kernel panic - not syncing: Host injected async #PF in interrupt disabled region Call Trace: <NMI> panic+0x52/0x60 __kvm_handle_async_pf+0xb0/0xb0 exc_page_fault+0x71/0xb0 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 RIP: 0010:__get_user_nocheck_8+0x6/0x20 perf_callchain_user+0x147/0x1a0 get_perf_callchain+0x12d/0x1c0 ... perf_event_nmi_handler+0x26/0x50 exc_nmi+0xe8/0x110 RIP: 0010:asm_exc_page_fault+0x0/0x30 </NMI> The last RIP line shows the NMI landing on the first instruction of the #PF entry. perf with user call chains takes such a fault: the sampling NMI walks the user stack with __get_user(), which faults when a saved frame pointer is not a valid user address or the walk runs off the top of the stack. The same window exists when KVM, running as an L1 hypervisor with DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT, reads the flags itself after a #PF VM-exit. The NMI entry code saves and restores CR2 for this nesting, but not the async #PF reason. Andy Lutomirski described the race, with perf as the example, when async #PF delivery was reworked in 2020 [1]. Saving and clearing the flags across the NMI, next to CR2, was discussed there but not merged. Since that rework, Linux has stopped setting KVM_ASYNC_PF_SEND_ALWAYS, so the host delivers "page not present" only for user mode faults and a kernel-mode fault in NMI context (including kernel-mode #MC and #DB) cannot be an async page fault. In that case, return without touching the flags so that the interrupted handler finds them intact. Tested on v7.3-rc5 in a 4-vCPU, 2 GiB guest restored from a snapshot whose memory is served on demand through userfaultfd, so that reading it back takes async #PFs, while every thread samples hardware cycles with user call chains and points its frame pointer at an unmapped page. Without this patch the guest panicked as above in 3 of 3 runs. With it, the guest survived 3 of 3 runs of 60 seconds, and the host counted 148,441 to 153,334 kvm_async_pf_not_present events in the first 20 seconds of each. On 6.18.50 the results were the same: the guest panicked without the patch and survived with it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Fix page dirtying in sev_gmem_post_populate() set_page_dirty() requires that the caller holds some kind of lock to ensure that the page's mapping does not concurrently go away. That is not the case for a random page we got from get_user_pages_fast(), so use set_page_dirty_lock(). [sean: tag for stable]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVMX: Reset MMU back to the root MMU if loading L2 state fails for !VM-Entry Reset the vCPU's MMU pointer back to the root MMU if loading L2 state fails in the "not from VM-Entry" case, i.e. when emulating RSM or handling KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE. Failure to unwind the MMU pointer results in KVM trying to run L1 with a nested MMU, and is especially problematic if the vCPU manages to free its nested state before the VM crashes. Constructing the root for a nested EPT MMU goes through vmcs12, which is dynamically allocated/freed when nVMX is enabled/disabled. And so if the nested state is freed with the MMU still pointing at the nested MMU, KVM will hit a NULL pointer deref when attempting to get L1=>L2 EPTP. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000078 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 114a2d067 P4D 111743067 PUD 11141f067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 20 UID: 1000 PID: 1272 Comm: nested_tdp_faul Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-8c89f11d1a99b-sink-vm #1914 PREEMPTLAZY Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:nested_ept_get_eptp+0xb/0x10 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_mmu_load+0xcd/0x870 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x18f5/0x1f80 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c7/0x970 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x4d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x47491b </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CR2: 0000000000000078 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:nested_ept_get_eptp+0xb/0x10 [kvm_intel] [sean: write changelog]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown fsnotify_destroy_marks() keeps a reference to its current mark while it drops conn->lock to destroy the mark. This stabilizes the forward-walk cursor, but does not prevent a new mark from being inserted before it. For example, an inotify watch re-added after IN_IGNORED sorts before the old, detached mark for the same group. The walk can miss the replacement and then detach the entire connector from the object. The replacement is still on its group's marks_list and, for inotify, in the watch IDR. The group mutex no longer protects the connector's object from disappearing. An unprivileged fdinfo read racing the final detach can consequently call igrab(NULL): BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in igrab+0x24/0x100 Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000148 Call Trace: igrab+0x24/0x100 inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1dc/0x5e0 seq_show+0x397/0x690 Set a DESTROYING flag under conn->lock before starting the walk, and reject new marks on that connector with -ENOENT. The existing add-mark error paths undo the temporary group-list entry and the backend's watch allocation. Do not wait for teardown while holding the group mutex, which the destroyer needs. Once the old connector is detached, an add can install a fresh connector as before. This closes the insertion race for all object types using the common connector teardown, without changing the mark reference or SRCU lifetime rules.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: free the sbi after a grace period ext4_get_link() follows a symlink that keeps its target in a data block in rcu pathwalk mode with ext4_getblk(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT). That reads s_mount_state in the ASSERT() of ext4_getblk() and again in ext4_es_lookup_extent(), and the lookup bumps the extent status hit or miss counter, all through sb->s_fs_info. ext4_put_super() destroys those counters, clears sb->s_fs_info and frees the sbi without waiting for a grace period. A pathwalk that is still in ext4_get_link() when the last reference to the mount goes away then dereferences a NULL s_fs_info, the freed sbi or the destroyed percpu counters. With a pathwalk held up in ext4_get_link() while the last reference goes away: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af] RIP: 0010:ext4_getblk+0xf0/0x640 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_get_link+0x26c/0x410 pick_link+0xf96/0x1780 step_into_slowpath+0x9b8/0x1250 path_lookupat+0x484/0xb00 filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0 vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0 vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90 __do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period in namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose last reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir out of a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker. Keep sb->s_fs_info and free the sbi together with the extent status counters after a grace period. Split the counters out of ext4_es_unregister_shrinker() for that. The shrinker still gets wasted in ext4_put_super(), the counters go with the sbi.