CVE-2025-59529
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In versions up to and including 0.9-rc5, the simple protocol server ignores the documented client limit and accepts unlimited connections, allowing for easy local DoS. Although `CLIENTS_MAX` is defined, `server_work()` unconditionally `accept()`s and `client_new()` always appends the new client and increments `n_clients`. There is no check against the limit. When client cannot be accepted as a result of maximal socket number of avahi-daemon, it logs unconditionally error per each connection. Unprivileged local users can exhaust daemon memory and file descriptors, causing a denial of service system-wide for mDNS/DNS-SD. Exhausting local file descriptors causes increased system load caused by logging errors of each of request. Overloading prevents glibc calls using nss-mdns plugins to resolve `*.local.` names and link-local addresses. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available, but a candidate fix is available in pull request 808, and some workarounds are available. Simple clients are offered for nss-mdns package functionality. It is not possible to disable the unix socket `/run/avahi-daemon/socket`, but resolution requests received via DBus are not affected directly. Tools avahi-resolve, avahi-resolve-address and avahi-resolve-host-name are not affected, they use DBus interface. It is possible to change permissions of unix socket after avahi-daemon is started. But avahi-daemon does not provide any configuration for it. Additional access restrictions like SELinux can also prevent unwanted tools to access the socket and keep resolution working for trusted users.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2025-59529",
"sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
"published": "2025-12-18T21:15:53.637",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T20:17:19.563",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In versions up to and including 0.9-rc5, the simple protocol server ignores the documented client limit and accepts unlimited connections, allowing for easy local DoS. Although `CLIENTS_MAX` is defined, `server_work()` unconditionally `accept()`s and `client_new()` always appends the new client and increments `n_clients`. There is no check against the limit. When client cannot be accepted as a result of maximal socket number of avahi-daemon, it logs unconditionally error per each connection. Unprivileged local users can exhaust daemon memory and file descriptors, causing a denial of service system-wide for mDNS/DNS-SD. Exhausting local file descriptors causes increased system load caused by logging errors of each of request. Overloading prevents glibc calls using nss-mdns plugins to resolve `*.local.` names and link-local addresses. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available, but a candidate fix is available in pull request 808, and some workarounds are available. Simple clients are offered for nss-mdns package functionality. It is not possible to disable the unix socket `/run/avahi-daemon/socket`, but resolution requests received via DBus are not affected directly. Tools avahi-resolve, avahi-resolve-address and avahi-resolve-host-name are not affected, they use DBus interface. It is possible to change permissions of unix socket after avahi-daemon is started. But avahi-daemon does not provide any configuration for it. Additional access restrictions like SELinux can also prevent unwanted tools to access the socket and keep resolution working for trusted users."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Avahi es un sistema que facilita el descubrimiento de servicios en una red local a través de la suite de protocolos mDNS/DNS-SD. En versiones hasta la 0.9-rc2 inclusive, el servidor de protocolo simple ignora el límite de clientes documentado y acepta conexiones ilimitadas, permitiendo un DoS local fácil. Aunque 'CLIENTS_MAX' está definido, 'server_work()' 'accept()'a incondicionalmente y 'client_new()' siempre añade el nuevo cliente e incrementa 'n_clients'. No hay una comprobación contra el límite. Cuando un cliente no puede ser aceptado como resultado del número máximo de sockets de avahi-daemon, registra incondicionalmente un error por cada conexión. Usuarios locales sin privilegios pueden agotar la memoria del demonio y los descriptores de archivo, causando una denegación de servicio a nivel de sistema para mDNS/DNS-SD. Agotar los descriptores de archivo locales causa una carga del sistema aumentada debido al registro de errores de cada solicitud. La sobrecarga impide las llamadas a glibc que utilizan los plugins nss-mdns para resolver nombres '*.local.' y direcciones link-local. A la fecha de publicación, no hay versiones parcheadas conocidas disponibles, pero una solución candidata está disponible en la solicitud de extracción 808, y algunas soluciones alternativas están disponibles. Se ofrecen clientes simples para la funcionalidad del paquete nss-mdns. No es posible deshabilitar el socket unix '/run/avahi-daemon/socket', pero las solicitudes de resolución recibidas a través de DBus no se ven afectadas directamente. Las herramientas avahi-resolve, avahi-resolve-address y avahi-resolve-host-name no se ven afectadas, utilizan la interfaz DBus. Es posible cambiar los permisos del socket unix después de que avahi-daemon se inicie. Pero avahi-daemon no proporciona ninguna configuración para ello. Restricciones de acceso adicionales como SELinux también pueden evitar que herramientas no deseadas accedan al socket y mantener la resolución funcionando para usuarios de confianza."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "avahi",
"product": "avahi",
"versions": [
{
"version": "<= 0.9-rc5",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2025-12-18T20:41:46.401974Z",
"id": "CVE-2025-59529",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"operator": "OR",
"negate": false,
"cpeMatch": [
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:avahi:avahi:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.9",
"matchCriteriaId": "6481267F-934F-4A0C-9B25-59738E798458"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:avahi:avahi:0.9:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "76971590-AEED-4CB1-B7B7-45EA8FD11524"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/avahi/avahi/pull/808",
"source": "[email protected]",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
]
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/avahi/avahi/pull/975",
"source": "[email protected]"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/avahi/avahi/security/advisories/GHSA-73wf-3xmj-x82q",
"source": "[email protected]",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "https://zeropath.com/blog/avahi-simple-protocol-server-dos-cve-2025-59529",
"source": "[email protected]",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/12/19/1",
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Mailing List"
]
}
]
}