CVE-2026-104012

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).

Severity

HIGH

CVSS score

8.8 (v3.1)

Vulnerability status

Received

Source identifier

[email protected]

Published

2026-10-31 08:16:47.893000

Last modified

2026-10-31 08:16:47.893000

View original CVE JSON

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-104012",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-10-31T08:16:47.893",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-31T08:16:47.893",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1)."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "roxnor",
          "product": "Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "0",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "1.3.1",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "source": "[email protected]",
        "type": "Primary",
        "cvssData": {
          "version": "3.1",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9
      }
    ]
  },
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "type": "Primary",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zip",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php#L38",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/REST/SaveCustomer.php#L262",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/REST/BookingConfirm.php#L61",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/Services/CustomerService.php#L74",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a32f428-fa6e-469b-b004-e80a1029af80?source=cve",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    }
  ]
}