CVE-2026-10639
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref -> k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call'). The post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply->iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer. The path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input -> net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers -> icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS). The defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-10639",
"sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
"published": "2026-06-16T15:16:34.207",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref -> k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').\n\nThe post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply->iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.\n\nThe path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input -> net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers -> icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).\n\nThe defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En la pila IPv4 nativa de Zephyr, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() en subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c construye un paquete de respuesta de eco (reply), lo entrega a net_try_send_data(), y luego, si tiene éxito, llama a net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfiere la propiedad de reply a la ruta TX (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - envío L2/controlador, o el hilo asíncrono net_if_tx_thread), que puede desreferenciarlo a refcount 0 y devolver la estructura net_pkt a su slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) antes de que se ejecute la línea de estadísticas. net_core.c documenta este contrato exacto (’el pkt podría contener basura ya ... no usar pkt después de esa llamada’).\n\nEl net_pkt_iface(reply) posterior al envío, por lo tanto, lee reply-iface de un net_pkt liberado (y posiblemente ya reasignado), una lectura de uso después de liberación; con CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE la macro de estadísticas incrementa adicionalmente un contador a través de ese valor, es decir, una desreferencia/escritura a través de un puntero obsoleto o de ranura reciclada.\n\nLa ruta es alcanzada sin autenticación por cualquier host remoto que haga ping al dispositivo (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) y está condicionada a CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. El impacto es una lectura probabilística de memoria de paquete reciclada más una posible escritura de puntero salvaje bajo una condición de carrera de tiempo, lo que lleva muy probablemente a estadísticas de interfaz corruptas o a un fallo (DoS) que puede ser activado remotamente.\n\nEl defecto fue introducido en 2019 (v1.14) y está presente hasta la v4.4.0. El cambio complementario en net_icmpv4_send_error() no es un uso después de liberación porque lee net_pkt_iface(orig), el paquete recibido propiedad del llamador, que permanece activo durante el envío. La solución almacena en caché el puntero de interfaz del paquete recibido activo antes de enviar y lo utiliza para las actualizaciones de estadísticas posteriores al envío."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"product": "zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "4.2.0",
"lessThan": "4.3.1",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "4.4.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.1",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"baseScore": 4.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 2.5
},
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Primary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"baseScore": 4.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 2.5
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-06-16T15:29:17.028934Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-10639",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"operator": "OR",
"negate": false,
"cpeMatch": [
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "1.14.0",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.5.0",
"matchCriteriaId": "724B210A-D0E2-4BDF-8986-A1C4691CE210"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/86e21665d4641f304dc3895bfb03b8f89db83291",
"source": "[email protected]",
"tags": [
"Patch"
]
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw",
"source": "[email protected]",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
]
}
]
}