CVE-2026-10660
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection. When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds). Even below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption. The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-10660",
"sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
"published": "2026-07-11T17:16:23.920",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection.\n\nWhen the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds).\n\nEven below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption.\n\nThe fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El cliente GATT Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant en subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reensambló datos remotos de Broadcast Receive State en un único net_buf_simple estático de archivo (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) compartido por todas las instancias de conexión, mientras que el indicador BUSY, el manejador de lectura larga y el estado de reinicio/desplazamiento eran por conexión.\n\nCuando el dispositivo actúa como un Broadcast Assistant conectado a múltiples periféricos Scan Delegator, las devoluciones de llamada de notificación y lectura larga de diferentes conexiones se entrelazan en el búfer compartido: la adición en notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem en la rama no ocupada) no realiza ninguna comprobación de espacio restante, por lo que las notificaciones de estado de recepción de dos o más delegadores se acumulan en el mismo búfer de 512 bytes y, con una MTU ATT configurada suficientemente grande (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU hasta 2000) y de dos a tres conexiones concurrentes, escriben más allá del búfer en el .bss adyacente (net_buf_simple_add solo se afirma en compilaciones de depuración).\n\nIncluso por debajo del umbral de desbordamiento, el net_buf_simple_reset de una conexión pone a cero la longitud compartida mientras que el reensamblaje y el desplazamiento de lectura GATT de otra conexión están en curso, mezclando los datos de un par en el análisis de otro. Un Scan Delegator malicioso o comprometido (o dos pares en colusión) a través de BLE puede desencadenar esto, causando escrituras fuera de límites (corrupción de memoria / denegación de servicio) y corrupción de datos entre conexiones.\n\nLa solución mueve el búfer a la estructura de instancia por conexión para que cada conexión reensamble en su propio búfer. Afecta a las versiones de Zephyr que distribuyen el Broadcast Assistant con el búfer compartido, incluyendo la v4.4.0 y anteriores."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"product": "zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "3.6.0",
"lessThan": "4.3.1",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "4.4.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"baseScore": 6.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 4.7
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-07-13T15:44:09.257224Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-10660",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/0cd61589ff820b6a585c73cb36f1e14b043a2795",
"source": "[email protected]"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-73c7-3rh7-v5p9",
"source": "[email protected]"
}
]
}