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CVE-2026-10683

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code. As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target. An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral. The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Severity
MEDIUM
CVSS score
4.6 (v3.1)
Vulnerability status
Analyzed
Source identifier
Published
2026-07-27 19:17:14.683000
Last modified
2026-10-24 13:10:00.147000
View original CVE JSON
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-10683",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-07-27T19:17:14.683",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:10:00.147",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.\n\nAs a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.\n\nAn I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.\n\nThe fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el controlador I2C Synopsys DesignWare (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) que opera en modo destino/esclavo, el gestor de interrupciones rx_full restringe la llamada de retorno write_requested() cuando dw  ->  state != CMD_SEND, y dw  ->  state solo se restablece a READY en una interrupción STOP. La interrupción START_DET, cuyo gestor en i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() restablecería el estado en cada (re)INICIO, nunca se añadió a la máscara de interrupciones habilitadas en i2c_dw_slave_register(), por lo que esa ruta de recuperación era código muerto.\n\nComo resultado, si la interrupción STOP se pierde (falla/reinicio del bus, o un maestro concurrente que activa STOP) o el maestro del bus emite una secuencia legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE con la misma dirección, el controlador permanece en CMD_SEND permanentemente y nunca vuelve a invocar write_requested() durante la vida útil del destino.\n\nUn maestro I2C en el mismo bus físico puede provocar esto deliberadamente, haciendo que la función de destino I2C funcione incorrectamente para todas las transacciones de escritura posteriores y desincronizando el estado de encuadre del consumidor (p. ej., MCTP-over-I2C), una denegación de servicio del periférico de destino recuperable mediante reinicio.\n\nLa solución desenmascara START_DET para que el estado se restablezca en cada (re)INICIO del bus. El impacto es solo en la disponibilidad a través de un bus local a nivel de placa; no se produce corrupción de memoria en el consumidor ’in-tree’, cuya escritura de búfer por byte se verifica de forma independiente en cuanto a límites."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c"
          ],
          "versions": [
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              "version": "4.0.0",
              "lessThan": "4.4.2",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
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          "baseScore": 2.4,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "PHYSICAL",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
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  "weaknesses": [
    {
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      "type": "Secondary",
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  ],
  "configurations": [
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      "nodes": [
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          "cpeMatch": [
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  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/06e2053efe0e324d71cc29cdd95160fff643730a",
      "source": "[email protected]",
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    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fj9c-r5qw-3639",
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}