CVE-2026-11894
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
The Realtek BEE Bluetooth HCI driver's send callback, bt_hci_bee_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c, violated the bt_hci_driver_api buffer-ownership contract. That contract requires the driver to consume (unref) the transmit net_buf only on success; on an error return the host caller retains ownership and unrefs the buffer itself. The pre-fix code routed all error paths through a shared cleanup label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code. Because the host TX paths (in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c) unref the buffer again after send() returns an error, the buffer is freed twice: the driver returns it to its net_buf pool and the host then unrefs the already-freed buffer, corrupting the shared pool / underflowing the reference count (CWE-415). The same error branch additionally dereferenced buf->len inside a LOG_ERR call after the buffer had already been unref'd, a read of freed memory (CWE-416) that is compiled in at the default error log level. The failing edges are reached when the controller's host-to-controller buffer allocation fails or the controller send fails (resource-exhaustion / IO conditions). A remote Bluetooth peer can push the device toward these conditions indirectly by driving heavy host transmit activity, at which point the double-free corrupts the host net_buf pool and most likely crashes the device, with residual potential for further memory corruption. The impact is confined to builds using this specific Realtek BEE HCI driver. The fix returns early from each error path without unreffing and unrefs the buffer only on the success path, restoring the ownership contract and eliminating both the double-free and the use-after-free read.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-11894",
"sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
"published": "2026-08-11T06:17:11.820",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T19:10:00.167",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Realtek BEE Bluetooth HCI driver's send callback, bt_hci_bee_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c, violated the bt_hci_driver_api buffer-ownership contract. That contract requires the driver to consume (unref) the transmit net_buf only on success; on an error return the host caller retains ownership and unrefs the buffer itself. The pre-fix code routed all error paths through a shared cleanup label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code.\n\nBecause the host TX paths (in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c) unref the buffer again after send() returns an error, the buffer is freed twice: the driver returns it to its net_buf pool and the host then unrefs the already-freed buffer, corrupting the shared pool / underflowing the reference count (CWE-415). The same error branch additionally dereferenced buf->len inside a LOG_ERR call after the buffer had already been unref'd, a read of freed memory (CWE-416) that is compiled in at the default error log level.\n\nThe failing edges are reached when the controller's host-to-controller buffer allocation fails or the controller send fails (resource-exhaustion / IO conditions). A remote Bluetooth peer can push the device toward these conditions indirectly by driving heavy host transmit activity, at which point the double-free corrupts the host net_buf pool and most likely crashes the device, with residual potential for further memory corruption. The impact is confined to builds using this specific Realtek BEE HCI driver.\n\nThe fix returns early from each error path without unreffing and unrefs the buffer only on the success path, restoring the ownership contract and eliminating both the double-free and the use-after-free read."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "La función de devolución de llamada de envío del controlador HCI Bluetooth BEE de Realtek, bt_hci_bee_send() en drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c, violó el contrato de propiedad del búfer de bt_hci_driver_api. Ese contrato requiere que el controlador consuma (libere la referencia de) el net_buf de transmisión solo en caso de éxito; en caso de un retorno de error, el llamador del host retiene la propiedad y libera la referencia del búfer por sí mismo. El código anterior a la corrección enrutaba todas las rutas de error a través de una etiqueta de limpieza compartida que llamaba incondicionalmente a net_buf_unref(buf) antes de devolver el código de error.\n\nDebido a que las rutas TX del host (en subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c) liberan la referencia del búfer nuevamente después de que send() devuelve un error, el búfer se libera dos veces: el controlador lo devuelve a su grupo net_buf y el host luego libera la referencia del búfer ya liberado, corrompiendo el grupo compartido / desbordando negativamente el contador de referencias (CWE-415). La misma rama de error desreferenciaba adicionalmente buf -> len dentro de una llamada LOG_ERR después de que el búfer ya había sido liberado de su referencia, una lectura de memoria liberada (CWE-416) que se compila en el nivel de registro de errores predeterminado.\n\nLos puntos de fallo se alcanzan cuando la asignación de búfer de host a controlador del controlador falla o el envío del controlador falla (agotamiento de recursos / condiciones de E/S). Un par Bluetooth remoto puede empujar el dispositivo hacia estas condiciones indirectamente al impulsar una intensa actividad de transmisión del host, momento en el cual la doble liberación corrompe el grupo net_buf del host y muy probablemente bloquea el dispositivo, con potencial residual para una mayor corrupción de memoria. El impacto se limita a las compilaciones que utilizan este controlador HCI BEE de Realtek específico.\n\nLa corrección regresa temprano de cada ruta de error sin liberar la referencia y libera la referencia del búfer solo en la ruta de éxito, restaurando el contrato de propiedad y eliminando tanto la doble liberación como la lectura de uso después de liberación."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"product": "zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "4.4.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 4.2
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-08-11T17:04:26.697150Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-11894",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-415"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/9a684b5c314fb1d8670b01f7b6c4450a9353906c",
"source": "[email protected]"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-v9mj-h2m6-v9c6",
"source": "[email protected]"
}
]
}