CVE-2026-12631
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
The Zephyr kernel validates the k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() system calls (declared __syscall in include/zephyr/kernel.h) through thread_obj_validate() in kernel/thread.c. Its default switch branch is the access-denied path, taken when k_object_validate() returns -EPERM (the calling user thread was never granted access to the target thread object) or -EBADF (the supplied pointer is not a registered kernel object of the right type). That branch invoked K_OOPS(K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(ret, "access denied")), but K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG treats a true expression as success; the non-zero error code ret therefore read as "verified OK", the kernel oops was never raised, and control fell through to CODE_UNREACHABLE. Because k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() are system calls, an unprivileged user-mode thread (under CONFIG_USERSPACE) can reach this denial path directly by calling either syscall on a thread object it does not own. Instead of the offending thread being cleanly terminated, execution reaches __builtin_unreachable() while running in supervisor mode inside the syscall handler. On Clang builds CODE_UNREACHABLE emits an illegal-instruction trap, so a user thread can deterministically crash the kernel — a locally triggerable denial of service that escapes the userspace sandbox. On GCC builds the path is undefined behavior: the compiler may drop the return-value handling for thread_obj_validate(), so it can return an undefined bool; if that is false, the caller proceeds into the real k_thread_join()/k_thread_abort() implementation for a thread the user was never authorized to access, an access-control bypass. The fix changes the verification expression to ret == 0, so a denied (non-zero) result now correctly raises K_OOPS and terminates the offending caller.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-12631",
"sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
"published": "2026-08-18T21:16:33.647",
"lastModified": "2026-10-22T22:10:00.250",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Zephyr kernel validates the k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() system calls (declared __syscall in include/zephyr/kernel.h) through thread_obj_validate() in kernel/thread.c. Its default switch branch is the access-denied path, taken when k_object_validate() returns -EPERM (the calling user thread was never granted access to the target thread object) or -EBADF (the supplied pointer is not a registered kernel object of the right type). That branch invoked K_OOPS(K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(ret, \"access denied\")), but K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG treats a true expression as success; the non-zero error code ret therefore read as \"verified OK\", the kernel oops was never raised, and control fell through to CODE_UNREACHABLE.\n\nBecause k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() are system calls, an unprivileged user-mode thread (under CONFIG_USERSPACE) can reach this denial path directly by calling either syscall on a thread object it does not own. Instead of the offending thread being cleanly terminated, execution reaches __builtin_unreachable() while running in supervisor mode inside the syscall handler.\n\nOn Clang builds CODE_UNREACHABLE emits an illegal-instruction trap, so a user thread can deterministically crash the kernel — a locally triggerable denial of service that escapes the userspace sandbox. On GCC builds the path is undefined behavior: the compiler may drop the return-value handling for thread_obj_validate(), so it can return an undefined bool; if that is false, the caller proceeds into the real k_thread_join()/k_thread_abort() implementation for a thread the user was never authorized to access, an access-control bypass.\n\nThe fix changes the verification expression to ret == 0, so a denied (non-zero) result now correctly raises K_OOPS and terminates the offending caller."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El kernel Zephyr valida las llamadas al sistema k_thread_join() y k_thread_abort() (declaradas __syscall en include/zephyr/kernel.h) a través de thread_obj_validate() en kernel/thread.c. Su rama switch predeterminada es la ruta de acceso denegado, tomada cuando k_object_validate() devuelve -EPERM (el hilo de usuario llamante nunca tuvo acceso concedido al objeto de hilo objetivo) o -EBADF (el puntero suministrado no es un objeto kernel registrado del tipo correcto). Esa rama invocó K_OOPS(K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(ret, ’access denied’)), pero K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG trata una expresión verdadera como éxito; el código de error no nulo ret, por lo tanto, se leyó como ’verified OK’, el oops del kernel nunca se generó, y el control pasó a CODE_UNREACHABLE.\n\nDebido a que k_thread_join() y k_thread_abort() son llamadas al sistema, un hilo en modo usuario sin privilegios (bajo CONFIG_USERSPACE) puede alcanzar esta ruta de denegación directamente llamando a cualquiera de las syscall en un objeto de hilo que no posee. En lugar de que el hilo infractor sea terminado limpiamente, la ejecución alcanza __builtin_unreachable() mientras se ejecuta en modo supervisor dentro del gestor de syscall.\n\nEn compilaciones de Clang, CODE_UNREACHABLE emite una trampa de instrucción ilegal, por lo que un hilo de usuario puede bloquear el kernel de forma determinista - una denegación de servicio activable localmente que escapa al sandbox del espacio de usuario. En compilaciones de GCC, la ruta es un comportamiento indefinido: el compilador puede omitir el manejo del valor de retorno para thread_obj_validate(), por lo que puede devolver un booleano indefinido; si eso es falso, el llamante procede a la implementación real de k_thread_join()/k_thread_abort() para un hilo al que el usuario nunca fue autorizado a acceder, una omisión de control de acceso.\n\nLa solución cambia la expresión de verificación a ret == 0, por lo que un resultado denegado (no nulo) ahora genera correctamente K_OOPS y termina al llamante infractor."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"product": "zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/thread.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "2.3.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
"impactScore": 4.0
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-08-19T13:17:32.022813Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-12631",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "[email protected]",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/bd1828652dfc217ba9f3a2221a7499cd8914ed9c",
"source": "[email protected]"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-crfw-75jw-hjm3",
"source": "[email protected]"
}
]
}