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CVE-2026-13214

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON "key" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048). The GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose "key" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes. The consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.

Severity
CRITICAL
CVSS score
9.8 (v3.1)
Vulnerability status
Awaiting Analysis
Source identifier
Published
2026-08-25 05:17:20.060000
Last modified
2026-11-04 05:18:41.540000
View original CVE JSON
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-13214",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-08-25T05:17:20.060",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-04T05:18:41.540",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).\n\nThe GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose \"key\" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.\n\nThe consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "El cliente OCPP 1.6 en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contiene un desbordamiento de búfer de pila en parse_getconfig_msg(). Al manejar una solicitud GetConfiguration del sistema central, el gestor copió la cadena JSON 'key' controlada por el atacante en el búfer de pila fijo de 50 bytes del llamador (skey[CISTR50], declarado en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) usando un strcpy() sin límites. El valor de clave analizado apunta directamente al búfer de recepción, por lo que su longitud está limitada solo por el tamaño del mensaje (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, predeterminado 2048).\n\nEl mensaje GetConfiguration se entrega a través de la conexión WebSocket que el punto de carga abre a su sistema central configurado. El hilo lector ocpp_wsreader() lee el mensaje en ui -> recv_buf y lo despacha a parse_getconfig_msg() a través de la tabla de funciones PDU. Un atacante que controla el punto final del sistema central, o un man-in-the-middle en una conexión no cifrada, puede enviar una solicitud GetConfiguration cuando campo 'key' excede los 50 bytes y desbordar la pila del hilo lector con bytes elegidos por el atacante.\n\nLa consecuencia es un aplastamiento de pila (stack smash) activable remotamente en el hilo lector OCPP: como mínimo una denegación de servicio, y plausiblemente ejecución remota de código dependiendo del endurecimiento en tiempo de compilación, como los canarios de pila y la configuración de MPU. La solución reemplaza el strcpy() con un strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) con límites, seguido de una terminación NUL explícita, coincidiendo con las copias con límites ya utilizadas por los gestores hermanos."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c"
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "4.3.0",
              "lessThan": "4.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "lessThan": "4.4.2",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "source": "[email protected]",
        "type": "Secondary",
        "cvssData": {
          "version": "3.1",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "timestamp": "2026-08-25T15:15:40.750127Z",
          "id": "CVE-2026-13214",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "type": "Secondary",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/afbf880b04188ae53451a0ade4ac62b654fdff34",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    }
  ]
}