CVE-2026-17350
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-17350",
"sourceIdentifier": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"published": "2026-07-31T16:16:59.617",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T23:10:00.157",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single \"front door\" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nThe reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure.\n\nDuring remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class.\n\nAn authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs.\n\nBecause the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means.\n\nSocket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nFix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El sistema de permisos por herramienta (roles personalizados / permisos de herramienta basados en roles, introducido en pgAdmin 4 9.3) no aplicaba su verificación de permisos de manera consistente. En modo SERVIDOR, pgAdmin 4 protege cada herramienta detrás de un permiso Flask-Security por herramienta, pero el decorador de permisos (permissions_required) se aplicaba solo a una única ruta de ’puerta principal’ por herramienta. Cada otra ruta de backend y gestor de Socket.IO en el flujo de trabajo de esa herramienta dependía únicamente de pga_login_required/socket_login_required, que verifican la autenticación pero no el permiso de la herramienta.\n\nEl reportero verificó tres casos contra una compilación de prueba: (1) un usuario sin permiso tools_query_tool recibió 403 en la ruta de inicialización protegida de sqleditor, pero la misma sesión procedió a conectar el servidor, inicializar la cadena de backend de viewdata y recuperar contenido real de filas de tabla; (2) un usuario sin tools_grant_wizard recibió 403 en la ruta acl protegida, pero la misma sesión aún enumeró objetos otorgables, generó SQL GRANT y lo aplicó con éxito -- confirmado del lado de la base de datos a través de has_table_privilege(); (3) un usuario sin tools_schema_diff recibió 403 en la ruta de panel protegida, pero la misma sesión inicializó la diferencia de esquema, enumeró y conectó bases de datos, y obtuvo diferencias DDL reales a través del gestor de Socket.IO compare_database. El reportero también confirmó un problema relacionado pero distinto: un no propietario que activó /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server contra un servidor compartido propiedad de un administrador hizo que pgAdmin persistiera una nueva fila de servidor que seguía siendo propiedad del administrador (user_id/shared sin cambios desde el origen), a pesar de que el propio intento de conexión informó un fallo.\n\nDurante la remediación, se encontró que la misma brecha de permisos solo de puerta principal también afectaba a las herramientas ERD, PSQL y Debugger, y a los planos de Backup, Restore, Maintenance e Import/Export, ninguno de los cuales formaba parte del informe original; estos se corrigieron utilizando el mismo patrón como una extensión de la clase de defecto reportada.\n\nUn usuario autenticado que tenía un inicio de sesión pgAdmin válido y una conexión de base de datos almacenada y funcional, pero a quien un administrador le había denegado explícitamente el permiso de una herramienta específica, por lo tanto, aún podía manejar esa herramienta de extremo a extremo a través de sus otras rutas y sockets, incluyendo la obtención de una sesión psql interactiva sobre el espacio de nombres /pty de Socket.IO e invocando trabajos de backup/restore/maintenance/import-export.\n\nDebido a que el bypass solo restaura el acceso a herramientas que operan sobre la propia conexión de base de datos ya autenticada del usuario, no otorga al usuario ningún privilegio de base de datos que no poseyera ya; elude la propia política de control de acceso a nivel de herramienta de pgAdmin (un control de segregación de funciones organizacional, separado de la autorización a nivel de base de datos), permitiendo a un usuario acceder a una característica de pgAdmin que un administrador pretendía denegarles, utilizando capacidades que su rol de base de datos existente ya permite por otros medios.\n\nLos gestores de eventos de Socket.IO no tenían un equivalente de permissions_required consciente de los permisos; solo existía socket_login_required, que verificaba la autenticación pero no el permiso de la herramienta.\n\nLa corrección añade un decorador socket_permissions_required (reflejando permissions_required, respetando el bypass del Administrador, leyendo permisos a través de has_permission()) y lo aplica, junto con permissions_required, como el decorador más externo en cada ruta de backend y gestor de Socket.IO para las herramientas afectadas. Las pruebas de regresión afirman 403 en cada ruta protegida y gestor de socket para un usuario sin permisos.\n\nEste problema afecta a pgAdmin 4 en modo --TRUNCADO--"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "pgadmin.org",
"product": "pgAdmin 4",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Query Tool",
"Grant Wizard",
"Schema Diff",
"ERD Tool",
"PSQL Tool",
"Debugger",
"Backup",
"Restore",
"Maintenance",
"Import/Export"
],
"programFiles": [
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/authenticate/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/sqleditor/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/grant_wizard/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/schema_diff/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/erd/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/psql/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/debugger/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/backup/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/restore/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/maintenance/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/import_export/__init__.py"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
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"version": "9.3",
"lessThan": "9.17",
"versionType": "custom",
"status": "affected"
}
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}
]
}
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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