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CVE-2026-19185

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

The system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c validated the outer struct i3c_ccc_payload, the broadcast ccc.data buffer and the targets.payloads[] array, but did not validate the per-target data buffers those array elements point at. Each struct i3c_ccc_target_payload carries its own data pointer and data_len, and neither was passed through K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() before the payload was handed to z_impl_i3c_do_ccc() and on to the controller driver. The verifier also operated on the caller's live structure rather than a snapshot, so validated fields could be changed by a second user thread between the check and the driver's use — unlike the sibling z_vrfy_i3c_transfer(), which has always copied its message array first. The defect is only present in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, where drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c is compiled. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the I3C controller device object — the ordinary way an application lets a user thread talk to I3C peripherals — can issue a direct CCC whose target payload data pointer names an arbitrary kernel address. Controller drivers dereference that pointer directly (for example drivers/i3c/i3c_mcux.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_cdns.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_stm32.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_npcx.c), using rnw to decide direction. A read CCC therefore causes the kernel-mode driver to write bus-received bytes into an attacker-chosen kernel address for an attacker-chosen length, and a write CCC transmits kernel memory out onto the I3C bus. The result is an out-of-bounds kernel write plus a kernel memory disclosure, i.e. escalation from a user-mode thread to supervisor privilege, defeating the isolation CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide. The fix introduces copy_ccc_and_do(), which snapshots the payload, copies the target array into kernel memory with k_usermode_alloc_from_copy() (bounding num_targets to fewer than 32), validates each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to rnw, and copies the driver-written num_xfer and err fields back to the caller.

Severity
HIGH
CVSS score
7.8 (v3.1)
Vulnerability status
Awaiting Analysis
Source identifier
Published
2026-10-05 09:17:13.077000
Last modified
2026-11-04 05:18:47.637000
View original CVE JSON
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-19185",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-10-05T09:17:13.077",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-04T05:18:47.637",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c validated the outer struct i3c_ccc_payload, the broadcast ccc.data buffer and the targets.payloads[] array, but did not validate the per-target data buffers those array elements point at. Each struct i3c_ccc_target_payload carries its own data pointer and data_len, and neither was passed through K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() before the payload was handed to z_impl_i3c_do_ccc() and on to the controller driver. The verifier also operated on the caller's live structure rather than a snapshot, so validated fields could be changed by a second user thread between the check and the driver's use — unlike the sibling z_vrfy_i3c_transfer(), which has always copied its message array first.\n\nThe defect is only present in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, where drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c is compiled. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the I3C controller device object — the ordinary way an application lets a user thread talk to I3C peripherals — can issue a direct CCC whose target payload data pointer names an arbitrary kernel address. Controller drivers dereference that pointer directly (for example drivers/i3c/i3c_mcux.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_cdns.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_stm32.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_npcx.c), using rnw to decide direction.\n\nA read CCC therefore causes the kernel-mode driver to write bus-received bytes into an attacker-chosen kernel address for an attacker-chosen length, and a write CCC transmits kernel memory out onto the I3C bus. The result is an out-of-bounds kernel write plus a kernel memory disclosure, i.e. escalation from a user-mode thread to supervisor privilege, defeating the isolation CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide.\n\nThe fix introduces copy_ccc_and_do(), which snapshots the payload, copies the target array into kernel memory with k_usermode_alloc_from_copy() (bounding num_targets to fewer than 32), validates each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to rnw, and copies the driver-written num_xfer and err fields back to the caller."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "z_vrfy_i3c_do_ccc"
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "3.2.0",
              "lessThan": "4.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "lessThan": "4.5.0",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "source": "[email protected]",
        "type": "Secondary",
        "cvssData": {
          "version": "3.1",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "timestamp": "2026-10-05T14:06:01.294641Z",
          "id": "CVE-2026-19185",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "type": "Secondary",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-822"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/35562f22f40c6d2f31969a31f0a4902e5b067f27",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-pcrr-29j7-8w57",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    }
  ]
}