CVE-2026-42810

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions. In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary- credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations. The confirmed behavior includes: - reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]); - listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]); - and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix. A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access. A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`. In Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.

Severity

CRITICAL

CVSS score

9.4 (v4.0)

Vulnerability status

Analyzed

Source identifier

[email protected]

Published

2026-05-04 17:16:26.493000

Last modified

2026-10-26 19:10:00.163000

View original CVE JSON

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-42810",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-05-04T17:16:26.493",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-26T19:10:00.163",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Apache Polaris acepta caracteres literales ’*’ en nombres de espacios de nombres y tablas. Cuando posteriormente construye políticas de acceso temporales de S3 para acceso delegado a tablas, esos mismos caracteres parecen ser reutilizados sin escapar en patrones de recursos de S3 IAM y condiciones ’s3:prefix’.\n\nEn la coincidencia de políticas de S3 IAM, ’*’ es tratado como un comodín en lugar de como texto ordinario. Eso significa que las credenciales temporales emitidas para una tabla manipulada pueden coincidir con la ruta de almacenamiento de una tabla diferente.\n\nEn pruebas privadas contra Polaris 1.4.0 utilizando la ruta de credenciales temporales de AWS S3 de Polaris tanto en MinIO como en AWS S3 real, las credenciales devueltas para tablas manipuladas como ’f.t1’, ’f.*’, ’*.*’ y ’foo.*’ podían alcanzar las ubicaciones S3 de otras tablas.\n\nEl comportamiento confirmado incluye:\n\n- leer el archivo de control de metadatos de otra tabla ([JSON de metadatos de Iceberg]);\n\n- listar el prefijo exacto de la tabla S3 de otra tabla ([prefijo de tabla]);\n\n- y, cuando se devolvió la delegación de escritura para la tabla manipulada, crear y eliminar un objeto bajo el prefijo exacto de la tabla S3 de otra tabla.\n\nUn caso de control utilizando nombres diferentes ordinarios no permitió el mismo acceso entre tablas.\n\nTambién se confirmó una variante de AWS S3 de mínimo privilegio en la que el principal atacante no tenía permisos de Polaris en la tabla víctima y solo los permisos mínimos requeridos para crear y usar una tabla comodín manipulada (con ámbito de espacio de nombres ’TABLE_CREATE’ y ’TABLE_WRITE_DATA’ en ’*’). En esa configuración, el acceso directo de Polaris a ’foo.t1’ permaneció prohibido, pero el atacante aún podía crear y cargar ’*.*’, recibir credenciales S3 delegadas y usar esas credenciales para listar, leer, crear y eliminar objetos bajo ’foo.t1’.\n\nEn Iceberg, el archivo JSON de metadatos es un archivo de control: les dice a los lectores qué archivos de datos pertenecen a la tabla, qué instantáneas existen y qué versión de la tabla leer. Por lo tanto, el acceso no autorizado a este ya es un problema significativo de confidencialidad. La variante confirmada con capacidad de escritura significa que el problema no se limita a la divulgación."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "product": "Apache Polaris",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "1.4.1",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
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        "type": "Secondary",
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          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
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          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED"
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    "cvssMetricV31": [
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      }
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    "ssvcV203": [
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        "ssvcData": {
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          "id": "CVE-2026-42810",
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              "exploitation": "none"
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            {
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          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
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  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "type": "Secondary",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-116"
        }
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  "references": [
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9",
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ]
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    {
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11",
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}