CVE-2026-68326
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event: sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len]; len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control; sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len; event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter. On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification. A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode. Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-68326",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:22.783",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T22:17:13.360",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer\n\nmwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the\n(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:\n\n\tsinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len];\n\tlen = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control;\n\tsinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len;\n\nevent->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,\nand the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into\nadapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the\nkmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter.\n\nOn the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with\ncfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each\nelement header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes\nactually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past\nevent_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a\nslab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).\nAn event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction\nnegative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.\nThe same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest\nover-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the\nNL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.\n\nA malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver\nsuch an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.\n\nValidate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the\nheader or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the\nevent was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,\na payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,\nso it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic\nMWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the\ntransport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]\nrather than the actually-received length because the transports store the\nevent differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in\nevent_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single\nfixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path\nanalogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617\n(\"wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets\")."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"lessThan": "f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
}
]
},
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "3.5",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "3.5",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "5.10.265",
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "5.15.216",
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.1.183",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.6.148",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.12.101",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.18.42",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.1.6",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.2",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"status": "unaffected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:47:09.561377Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-68326",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
]
}