CVE-2026-72889
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-72889",
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"published": "2026-08-19T08:17:13.833",
"lastModified": "2026-10-27T12:10:00.343",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Las versiones de Net::OAuth anteriores a la 0.33 para Perl permiten al remitente elegir el algoritmo de firma en verify.\n\nverify resuelve la clase del método de firma a partir del parámetro signature_method del mensaje entrante. signature_method es requerido en cada solicitud, por lo que el algoritmo utilizado para verificar una firma es elegido por quien la envió, y nada permite a la parte verificadora fijar el método en su lugar. Cuando un mensaje nombra HMAC-SHA1 o HMAC-SHA256, la clave se deriva de consumer_secret y token_secret en lugar de la clave que el proveedor implementó.\n\nUn proveedor implementado en RSA-SHA1 solo posee la clave pública del consumidor, y RFC 5849 no utiliza consumer_secret para ese método, por lo que el parámetro requerido se rellena con un marcador de posición. Un cliente que nombra HMAC-SHA1 en su lugar tiene su firma verificada contra ese marcador de posición, por lo que uno adivinable es suficiente para falsificar solicitudes para cualquier clave de consumidor y token."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"packageName": "Net-OAuth",
"modules": [
"Net::OAuth"
],
"programFiles": [
"lib/Net/OAuth/Message.pm",
"lib/Net/OAuth/Request.pm"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::verify"
},
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::_signature_method_class"
},
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Request::signature_key"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth",
"packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Net-OAuth",
"versions": [
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "0.33",
"versionType": "custom",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"timestamp": "2026-08-26T18:02:49.745063Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-72889",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"weaknesses": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"type": "Secondary",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-757"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2",
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
}
]
}