CVE-2026-85036

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-85036",
  "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]",
  "published": "2026-11-04T06:17:06.200",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-04T06:17:06.353",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Bluetooth Classic AVDTP layer defers releasing a session's stream endpoints: bt_avdtp_l2cap_disconnected() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avdtp.c ends with k_work_submit(&session->_release_work), placing the embedded struct k_work on the system work queue's pending list. When the same struct bt_avdtp object is immediately reused for a new signalling connection, the session memory is re-initialized — a2dp_get_connection() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c memset()s the whole struct bt_a2dp, and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept() / bt_avdtp_connect() call k_work_init() on session->_release_work — while that work item is still linked into k_sys_work_q.pending. Zeroing a linked sys_snode_t truncates the list while its tail pointer keeps pointing past the truncation.\n\nThe reuse window is deterministic rather than a race. All host RX processing runs on the Bluetooth RX work queue at a cooperative priority (CONFIG_BT_RX_PRIO), while _release_work is submitted to the lower-priority system work queue, so the release handler cannot run until the RX thread blocks. Because l2cap_br_recv() processes every signalling command contained in a single L2CAP signalling PDU back-to-back, a peer can send one PDU holding an L2CAP Disconnection Request for the AVDTP signalling channel followed by a Connection Request for PSM 0x0019; the second command reaches the session-reuse path with the release work provably still queued. The peer must already hold an encrypted AVDTP signalling channel, i.e. be a paired/bonded BR/EDR device.\n\nThe result is corruption of the global system work queue's pending list: either the queue silently stops executing any work at all (subsequent submissions are appended to a chain the head can no longer reach, and the orphaned items keep their K_WORK_QUEUED flag forever) or, in the tail variant, the list acquires a self-referencing node that the queue thread spins on. The written values are pointers to other struct k_work objects and are not attacker-controlled, so the impact is a device-wide, reboot-required denial of service rather than a controllable write primitive. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_A2DP are affected.\n\nThe fix is a two-commit unit, and neither commit closes the path on its own. ec822ceed83b adds a pending-release check to bt_avdtp_connect() and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept(), but the A2DP upper layer's a2dp_get_connection() memset()s the session — including the queued work item's list node and flags — before those checks run, so k_work_busy_get() would observe an already-cleared state. 2bd5ea88c69b closes that by making a2dp_get_connection() itself skip the reuse and return NULL while the release work is still pending, which both callers already handle by rejecting the connection attempt. Apply both commits together; either one alone leaves the device vulnerable."
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c",
            "subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avdtp.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "a2dp_get_connection"
            },
            {
              "name": "bt_avdtp_connect"
            },
            {
              "name": "bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept"
            },
            {
              "name": "bt_avdtp_l2cap_disconnected"
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "4.3.0",
              "lessThan": "4.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "lessThan": "4.5.0",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "source": "[email protected]",
        "type": "Secondary",
        "cvssData": {
          "version": "3.1",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "baseScore": 5.7,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
        "impactScore": 3.6
      }
    ]
  },
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "source": "[email protected]",
      "type": "Secondary",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-666"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/2bd5ea88c69bdd94fc5a9e6757b29e1de9903ef5",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/ec822ceed83b5008d4a28700fdacf2ff80020963",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-ffxg-752w-mv9x",
      "source": "[email protected]"
    }
  ]
}