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CVE-2026-90015

Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB's buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each. At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted: device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted A reproducer running this under qemu is available at https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs) already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track. Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping every segment that still has a pending bounce. Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg. [mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.]

Severity
Not scored
CVSS score
Not available
Vulnerability status
Received
Source identifier
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Published
2026-09-16 11:17:14.210000
Last modified
2026-10-19 09:18:49.393000
View original CVE JSON
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-90015",
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:17:14.210",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:49.393",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments\n\nWhen a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the\nendpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail\nthrough the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.\nxhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,\ncopies the data back into the URB's buffer.\n\nThe enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg,\nunder the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.\nThat assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more\nsegments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.\nOnly the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce\nbuffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.\n\nThe URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length\nand no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize\nsized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous\ncontents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.\n\nAny sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was\nfound with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity\ntarget with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather\nthan silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so\nwMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash\nblock. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them\ninto a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each.\nAt 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every\nsegment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to\nwMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and\ndm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted:\n\n  device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted\n\nA reproducer running this under qemu is available at\nhttps://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity\n\nThe bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs)\nalready lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track.\nKeep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on\ncompletion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping\nevery segment that still has a pending bounce.\n\nStopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce\nimplies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is\nalways strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started\nin end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign\nbounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk\ncorrect if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg.\n\n[mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.]"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "f9c589e142d04b8a19eb382162f804d17102b5ed",
              "lessThan": "c8124b28f12dbdd126118e63d0ebf8093a01fb81",
              "versionType": "git",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "f9c589e142d04b8a19eb382162f804d17102b5ed",
              "lessThan": "e04d5304a248e5d2a7f4faa87541644bdd320cfb",
              "versionType": "git",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "f9c589e142d04b8a19eb382162f804d17102b5ed",
              "lessThan": "a1629dfb011446d02905778f6df19f14c5f4f3b3",
              "versionType": "git",
              "status": "affected"
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              "versionType": "git",
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            {
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              "lessThan": "3c9a2b5a4f1183696f02ac280ced1d34afb409b1",
              "versionType": "git",
              "status": "affected"
            },
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              "versionType": "git",
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              "versionType": "git",
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            }
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        },
        {
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "4.8",
              "status": "affected"
            },
            {
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "4.8",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "5.10.270",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "5.15.221",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "6.18.51",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "status": "unaffected"
            },
            {
              "version": "7.3",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
              "status": "unaffected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {},
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c9a2b5a4f1183696f02ac280ced1d34afb409b1",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8124b28f12dbdd126118e63d0ebf8093a01fb81",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e04d5304a248e5d2a7f4faa87541644bdd320cfb",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff44dfb03a293bf30e31f98772a1dd316a6071d1",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ]
}