CVE-2026-97942
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr() From time to time, the following BUG can be observed in the x86 alternatives patching code [0]: > kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576! > Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed 8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 > RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320 > __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220 > arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0 > __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270 > static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150 > notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0 > blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0 > load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0 > init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140 > idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0 > __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0 > do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e which matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c: /* * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not * implemented. */ BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1])); This can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen if text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing of page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most users of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc range, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to race against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page(). Fix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock. [ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was: Pedro=>Lorenzo=>Mike=>Me which is reflected in the SoB chain now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to Pedro's post from the Link ]
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-97942",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:21.633",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:45.403",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr()\n\nFrom time to time, the following BUG can be observed\nin the x86 alternatives patching code [0]:\n\n > kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576!\n > Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed 8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64\n > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022\n > RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450\n > Call Trace:\n > <TASK>\n > smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320\n > __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220\n > arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0\n > __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270\n > static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150\n > notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0\n > blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0\n > load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0\n > init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140\n > idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0\n > __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0\n > do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610\n > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nwhich matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c:\n\n\t/*\n\t * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not\n\t * implemented.\n\t */\n\tBUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));\n\nThis can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen\nif text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing\nof page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most\nusers of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when\nCONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc\nrange, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to\nrace against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page().\n\nFix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock.\n\n[ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was:\n\t Pedro=>Lorenzo=>Mike=>Me which is reflected in the SoB chain\n\t now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to\n\t Pedro's post from the Link ]"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "64f6a4e10c05ed527f0f24b7954964255e0d3535",
"lessThan": "281e6f536f2f3f95d91938c5bd7ba9bcb4c1049d",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "64f6a4e10c05ed527f0f24b7954964255e0d3535",
"lessThan": "89c60435b90d32ab5e3a39da3ae73d463d07debe",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "64f6a4e10c05ed527f0f24b7954964255e0d3535",
"lessThan": "1587d3394e254639cc36516256031334095e6ef3",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
}
]
},
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "6.15",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "6.15",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.18.53",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.2.7",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.3",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"status": "unaffected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1587d3394e254639cc36516256031334095e6ef3",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/281e6f536f2f3f95d91938c5bd7ba9bcb4c1049d",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c60435b90d32ab5e3a39da3ae73d463d07debe",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
]
}