CVE-2026-98070
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset(). Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent. Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock. Two details of the old code go away with the same change: - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown() releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths remain as exposed to each other as they are today. - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down meanwhile and is dropped. The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-98070",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.193",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:18:02.123",
"vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()\n\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the\npath state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to\nbe sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling\nrds_send_path_reset().\n\nSampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()\ncan re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its\nstate recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the\nresetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the\nbit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire\noperation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss\neach other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with\nrds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly\nwhat the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to\nprevent.\n\nTake the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and\nrds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The\nlock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the\nlock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()\ncan never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.\n\nTwo details of the old code go away with the same change:\n\n - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code\n cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()\n releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before\n the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading\n it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the\n teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until\n then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths\n remain as exposed to each other as they are today.\n\n - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no\n serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal\n path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the\n previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path\n found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect\n worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes\n RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down\n meanwhile and is dropped.\n\nThe in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is\nrewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment\nabove the function (which still described a return value and an\nincomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four\nwriters - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what\nserializes each of them."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "335b48d980f631fbc5b233cbb3625ac0c86d67cb",
"lessThan": "670af4e4a4de5e6bb5daee3838485571a0caa5fa",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
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"lessThan": "830a2e21b200c6b6fdccc63dd3f23932bf7a894b",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
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"status": "affected"
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{
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"lessThan": "8e4c3b7844c906c7097b4cfedd9dd1f48c9a6a92",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
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{
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"lessThan": "062d9e008c67289e8e1b221ecdd8f9d60566d012",
"versionType": "git",
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{
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},
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "4.7",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "4.7",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "5.10.271",
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "5.15.222",
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.1.189",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.6.158",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.12.111",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.18.53",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.2.7",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.3",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"status": "unaffected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary",
"cvssData": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
]
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02c5f9dc2efd823e061954d564ce00bacd1bebeb",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/670af4e4a4de5e6bb5daee3838485571a0caa5fa",
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}