CVE-2026-98539
Full vulnerability record from the local CVENow database.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until unlock_new_inode(). ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode. If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the i_mutex_dir_key class. That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already hold by now... syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug "WARNING in do_new_mount" since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir() takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently: mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs") ntfs_create_inode() d_instantiate() user_path_at() finds the dentry do_lock_mount() inode_lock(inode) namespace_lock() unlock_new_inode() lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem) unlock_mount() inode_unlock(inode) The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody holds: DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write Call Trace: inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline] do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887 On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current) WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow(). Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode(). All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and keep using discard_new_inode(). May we never see this fscking bug report again.
View original CVE JSON
{
"id": "CVE-2026-98539",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:05.733",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:09.680",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's \"WARNING in do_new_mount\" saga\n\nntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes\nit with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until\nunlock_new_inode().\n\nntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was\nalready hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it\nwithout touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.\n\nIf the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls\nlockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the\ni_mutex_dir_key class.\n\nThat resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already\nhold by now...\n\nsyzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug\n\n \"WARNING in do_new_mount\"\n\nsince 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's\nexecutor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a\ndirectory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()\ntakes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:\n\n mkdir(\"./sys\") mount(NULL, \"./sys\", \"sysfs\")\n ntfs_create_inode()\n d_instantiate()\n user_path_at() finds the dentry\n do_lock_mount()\n inode_lock(inode)\n namespace_lock()\n unlock_new_inode()\n lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key()\n init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem)\n unlock_mount()\n inode_unlock(inode)\n\nThe mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody\nholds:\n\n DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...):\n count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0,\n curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write\n Call Trace:\n inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]\n unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline]\n do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline]\n do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887\n\nOn PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as\n\n DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current)\n WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock\n\nThe up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on\nthat directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory\nracing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via\ninode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow().\n\nSwitch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode().\nAll error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and\nkeep using discard_new_inode().\n\nMay we never see this fscking bug report again."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs3/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17",
"lessThan": "6fda7121cb6a8ea6fbd77d0f787f04b8e8b5358e",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17",
"lessThan": "37ec7353f4ac495b28284b0fcb0e53d21d1b3f3f",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17",
"lessThan": "1ae2a242c15b03470b1b16289298e597bbe3bb29",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17",
"lessThan": "1abd643f3783ea8f8e273c18697ff0413aa92dc7",
"versionType": "git",
"status": "affected"
}
]
},
{
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs3/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"versions": [
{
"version": "5.15",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "5.15",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.12.112",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "6.18.55",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.2.9",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"versionType": "semver",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"version": "7.3",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"status": "unaffected"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"metrics": {},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1abd643f3783ea8f8e273c18697ff0413aa92dc7",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ae2a242c15b03470b1b16289298e597bbe3bb29",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37ec7353f4ac495b28284b0fcb0e53d21d1b3f3f",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fda7121cb6a8ea6fbd77d0f787f04b8e8b5358e",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
]
}